Posts Tagged ‘disruption’
Companies often pay very close attention to new products from startups as they launched and ponder their impact on their scale, mainstream work. Almost all of the time the competitive risk was deemed minimal. Then one day the impact is significant.
In fact up until such a point most pundits and observers likely said that the startup will get overrun or crushed by a big company in the adjacent space. By this time it is often too late for the incumbent and what was a product challenge now looks like an opportunity to take on the challenges of venture integration.
Why is this dynamic so often repeated? Why does the advantage tilt to startups when it comes to innovation, particularly innovation that disrupts the traditional category definition or go to market of a product?
Much of the challenge described here is rooted in how we discuss technology disruption. Incumbents are faced with “disruption” on a daily basis and from all constituencies. To a great degree as an incumbent the sky is always falling. For every product that truly disrupts there are likely hundreds of products, technologies, marketing campaigns, pricing strategies and more that some were certain would be last straw for an incumbent.
Because statistically new ideas are not likely to disrupt and new companies are likely to fail, incumbents become experts at defining away the challenges and risks posed by a new entrant into the market. Incumbents view the risk of wild swings in strategy or execution as much higher risk than odds of a 1 in 100 chance a new technology upending the near term business. Factoring in any reasonable timeline and the incumbent has every incentive to side with statistics.
To answer “why startups aren’t features” this post looks at the three elements of a startup that competes with an incumbent: incumbent’s reaction, challenges faced by the incumbent, and the advantages of the startup.
When a startup enters a space thought (by the incumbent or conventional wisdom) to be occupied by an incumbent there are series of reasonably predictable reactions that take place. The more entrenched the incumbent the more reasoned and bullet proof the logic appears to be. Remember, most technologies fail to take hold and most startups don’t grow into significant competitors. I’ve personally reacted to this situation as both a startup and as the incumbent.
Doesn’t solve a problem customers have. The first reaction is to just declare a product as not solving a customer problem. This is sort of the ultimate “in the bubble” reaction because the reality is that the incumbent’s existing customers almost certainly don’t have the specific problem being solved because they too live in the very same context. In a world where enterprises were comfortable sending PPT/PDFs over dedicated lines to replicated file servers, web technologies didn’t solve a problem anyone had (this is a real example I experienced in evangelizing web technology).
Just a feature. The first reaction to most startups is that whatever is being done is a feature of an existing product. Perhaps the most famous of all of these was Steve Jobs declaring Dropbox to be “a feature not a product”. Across the spectrum from enterprise to consumer this reaction is routine. Every major communication service, for example, enabled the exchange of photos (AIM, Messenger, MMS, Facebook, and more). Yet, from Instagram to Snapchat some incredibly innovative and valuable startups have been created that to some do nothing more than slight variations in sharing photos. In collaboration, email, app development, storage and more enterprise startups continue to innovate in ways that solve problems in uniquely valuable ways all while incumbents feel like they “already do that”. So while something might be a feature of an existing product, it is almost certainly not a feature exactly like one in an existing product or likely to become one.
Only a month’s work. One asset incumbents have is an existing engineering infrastructure and user experience. So when a new “feature” becomes interesting in the marketplace and discussions turn to “getting something done” the conclusion is usually that the work is about a month. Often this is based on estimate for how much effort the startup put into the work. However, the incumbent has all sorts of constraints that turn that month into many months: globalization, code reviews, security audits, training customer support, developing marketing plans, enterprise customer roadmaps, not to mention all the coordination and scheduling adjustments. On top of all of that, we all know that it is far easier to add a new feature to a new code base than to add something to a large and complex code base. So rarely is something a month’s work in reality.
One thing worth doing as a startup (or as a customer of an incumbent) is considering why the challenges continue even if the incumbent spins up an effort to compete.
Just one feature. If you take at face value that the startup is doing just a feature then it is almost certainly the case that it will be packaged and communicated as such. The feature will get implemented as an add-on, an extra click or checkbox, and communicated to customers as part of the existing materials. In other words, the feature is an objection handler.
Takes a long time to integrate. At the enterprise level, the most critical part of any new feature or innovation is how it integrates with existing efforts. In that regard, the early feedback about the execution will always push for more integration with existing solutions. This will slow down the release of the efforts and tend to pile on more and more engineering work that is outside the domain of what the competitor is doing.
Doesn’t fit with broad value proposition. The other side of “just one feature” is that the go to market execution sees the new feature as somehow conflicting with the existing value proposition. This means that while people seem to be seeing great value in a solution the very existence of the solution runs counter to the core value proposition of the existing products. If you think about all those photo sharing applications, the whole idea was to collect all your photos, enable you to later share them or order prints or mugs. Along comes disappearing photos and that doesn’t fit at all with what you do. At the enterprise level, consider how the enterprise world was all about compliance and containing information while faced with file sharing that is all about beyond the firewall. Faced with reconciling these positioning elements, the incumbent will choose to sell against the startup’s scenario rather than embrace it.
Startups also have some advantages in this dynamic that are readily exploitable. Most of the time when a new idea is taking hold one can see how the startup is maximizing the value they bring along one of these dimensions.
Depth versus breadth. Because the incumbent often views something new as a feature of an existing product, the startup has an opportunity to innovate much more deeply in the space. In any scenario becomes interesting, the flywheel of innovation that comes from usage creates many opportunities to improve the scenario. So while the early days might look like a feature, a startup is committed to the full depth of a scenario and only that scenario. They don’t have any pressure to maintain something that already exists or spend energy elsewhere. In a world where customers want the app to offer a full stack solution or expect a tool to complete the scenario without integrating something else, this turns out to be a huge advantage.
Single release effort. The startup is focused on one line of development. There’s no coordination, no schedules to align, no longer term marketing plans to reconcile and so on. Incumbents will often try to change plans but more often than not the reactions are in whitepapers (for enterprise) or beta releases (for consumer). While it might seem obvious, this is where the clarity, focus, and scale of the startup can be most advantageous.
Clear and recognizable value proposition/identity. The biggest challenge incumbents face when adding a new capability to their product/product line is where to put it so it will get noticed. There’s already enormous surface area in the product, the marketing, and also in the business/pricing. Even the basics of telling customers that you’ve done something new is difficult and calling attention to a specific feature it often ends up as a supporting point on the third pillar. Ironically, those arguing to compete more directly are often faced with internal pressures that amount to “don’t validate the competitor that much”. This means even if the feature exists in the incumbent’s product, it is probably really difficult to know that and equally difficult to find. The startup perspective is that the company comes to stand for the entire end-to-end scenario and over time when customers’ needs turn to that feature or scenario, there is total clarity in where to get the app or service.
Even with all of these challenges, this dynamic continues: initially dismissing startup products, later attempting to build what they do, and in general difficulty in reacting to inherent advantages of a startup. One needs to look long and hard for a story where an incumbent organically competed and won against a startup in a category or feature area.
More often than not the new categories of products come about because there is a change in the computing landscape at a fundamental level. This change can be the business model, for example the change to software as a service. It could also be the architecture, such as a move to cloud. There could also be a discontinuity in the core computing platform, such as the switch to graphical interface, the web, or mobile.
There’s a more subtle change which is when an underlying technology change is simply too difficult for incumbents to do in an additive fashion. The best way to think about this is if an incumbent has products in many spaces but a new product arises that contains a little bit of two of the incumbent’s products. In order to effectively compete, the incumbent first must go through a process of deciding which team takes the lead in competing. Then they must address innovator’s dilemma challenges and allocate resources in this new area. Then they must execute both the technology plans and go to market plans. While all of this is happening, the startup unburdened by any of these races ahead creating a more robust and full featured solution.
At first this might seem a bit crazy. As you think about it though, modern software is almost always a combination of widely reused elements: messaging, communicating, editing, rendering, photos, identity, storage, API / customization, payments, markets, and so on. Most new products represent bundles or mash-ups of these ingredients. The secret sauce is the precise choice of elements and of course the execution. Few startups choose to compete head-on with existing products. As we know, the next big thing is not a reimplementation of the current big thing.
The secret weapon in startups competing with large scale incumbents is to create a product that spans the engineering organization, takes a counter-intuitive architectural approach, or lands in the middle of the different elements of a go to market strategy. While it might sound like a master plan to do this on purpose, it is amazing how often entrepreneurs simply see the need for new products as a blending of existing solutions, a revisiting of legacy architectural assumptions, and/or emphasis on different parts of the solution.
—Steven Sinofsky (@stevesi)
Attending the <code/conference> (#codecon) this past week turned out to be a remarkable experience, even more remarkable than I expected. The generational shift in our computing experience from desktop to mobile, from software to services, and from hundreds of millions to trillions was on display through the interviews with a dozen industry CEOs.
This post will explore this generational change through the speakers at the conference. Before diving into the details of each session, we will explore this change and the implicit context.
Reflecting on the interviews and demonstrations as well as the “lobby chatter” is a key part of learning by attending. I’ve always viewed this conference and predecessor D Conference as the most relevant conferences for learning about the strategic drivers of our industry. You can read my report from last year here. Writing these reports is part of the learning for me and reading the old reports lets me checkpoint on my own learning and journey.
If you move beyond the insights from any single speaker or the announcements at the event (all were widely reported by re/code and others and new this year by re/code partner CNBC), one theme just keeps coming back to me—the vast difference in tone and content between the incumbents and the challengers, between legacy and disruptors, between the old guard and the new, or whatever labels you want to use. We talk all the time about the transition of our industry from one era to another (and don’t forget the term “post-PC” was first used in this very forum) and the conference provides a microcosm expressed through leaders of these transitions taking place.
There is a vast difference in tone and content between the incumbents and the challengers, between legacy and disruptors, between the old guard and the new.
The transition is in full force. This does not mean by definition that all existing companies will lose and only new companies will win. Quite the contrary, the fact that these changes are now visible to all makes the creation, purchase, and use of new products and technologies evidence of the transition, as well as opportunity to create new plans and adjust. The mobile internet is causing the transition but also making the communication of that very transition much more transparent, which is unlike the progressive unveiling that characterized the mainframe to mini to PC transition.
Are the new companies doing enough to transition customers as well as their own business to new paradigms? How much should new companies bridge from existing solutions or should they expect a wholesale change from customers? Is there an understanding of the existing complexities of the real world?
Are the incumbents changing enough to build new products and business that reflect the new generation? Are they trying too much to “thread the needle” and incrementally step to a new context by maintaining status quo or “repotting the plants”? Is there an understanding of the complexities of existing solutions?
puts this "generational" change out there for us to experience through the always challenging, yet always consistently even-handed questioning (interrogation) from Walt and Kara (and a great addition this year were interviews featuring seasoned members of the re/code team).
Context (is everything in business)
The attendees (in the audience) are people who have worked in the industry often times since the earliest days. The interviewers are professionals who cover deeply the industry and the subjects. It is hard to imagine creating a more informed or tougher environment. That’s the challenge.
Yet, industry leaders both line up and are obliged to appear (for the most part). Because the environment is so challenging and widely covered, leaders gain a great deal of credibility by standing up to the challenge.
Leaders gain a great deal of credibility by standing up to the challenge of appearing.
The conference takes place the same time every year, whether a company has something to announce or not. For example, last year attendees were frustrated because Apple’s Tim Cook did not announce anything. This is an unfair way to look at the “performance” of a participant. This conference has an amazing audience, but it is also an “uncontrolled” environment so announcing a new product is not without risk and not without huge upside (Disclaimer: I’ve been part of several product announcements/interviews at this forum). Apple, along with many companies, has a tried and true approach to announcing new things as we will see next week.
What is most interesting about the forum, however, is that the format and depth of the dialog allows for a strong “how did we get here” or “how are you wrestling with challenges” discussion. This is not a one-way speech or a forum where talking points go unchallenged. That is in a sense what separates the men from the boys so to speak.
When speakers prepare for the interview, especially at larger companies, folks in communications prepare talking points, responses to tough questions, anecdotes, and even jokes. This is a forum where this can take on “Presidential debate” levels of preparation. The challenge is that everyone in the audience and certainly the interviewers are all well-versed in these techniques. For the presenters, all of that over-preparation cycles through your mind during the tough questions and unpredictable questions from the audience. This is a tough environment.
When speakers choose not to say anything of depth or the answer is clearly a prepared message, you can almost feel the energy in the room drain. There is a collective sense of a missed opportunity to learn more among attendees.
When speakers choose not to say anything of depth or the answer is clearly a prepared message, you can almost feel the energy in the room drain.
Too many people focus on CEOs evading questions about the next big deal or the features/availability of the next product. I don’t think that is a way to evaluate speakers and in almost all cases the interviewers ask a question like this one time often make a joke and move on.
Reporters have an obligation to ask or they look like they are not doing their job. Speakers have an obligation to acknowledge such a forward-looking, material statement and move on. There’s a big caveat to this and where I wanted to share my own learning, my own journey. I believe when it comes to challenges and strategy, CEOs specifically and companies in general can and should do more to inform the dialog. The way I would say this is that if there is something out there that everyone knows to be a fact and the speaker knows to be a fact and everyone knows everyone knows, then talk about it. By not talking about it, the conventional wisdom becomes the reality and the conventional wisdom is often wrong and always incomplete.
I have personally experienced this in the transition from Windows Vista to Windows 7. “Everyone” knew something was up with Vista and certainly Microsoft knew, but no one was saying anything. The result was a strong desire to know the next features of Windows, which was the only thing that folks knew to ask. It served no one to talk about the features of the next product but it also served no one to pretend everything was going well. I missed a big opportunity and looked foolish in a very early interview I did with a (now) re/code reporter. I followed the tried and true approach of the incumbent which is to say nothing, redirect, and so on. See several thousand words without saying anything appear here, from 6 years ago this week.
It turns out that in a world of global instant communication, transparency, open source, platform shifts, and so on that the story about the products, the strategy, and more can come to define efforts more than folks think. This isn’t always the case because business is a social science, but by and large what distinguishes the way the PC era evolved from the way the mobile era is evolving is a vast difference in the flow of information and pace of change. Corporate communications and the leadership approach need to adapt to this era. Recognizing this one thing we did on the above transition in Windows was start blogging about the “why” of the product long before the release, which to this day was a unique level of transparency (and also a huge challenge).
The generational change taking place now is challenging large companies more than ever before. Technology companies are seeing their investments and assets have faster lifecycles and shorter lifespans. They should address head on the challenges of these timescales and commitments. Business approaches are also being challenged and everyone knows this on all sides, but not talking about the challenges means everyone just assumes how things will evolve, and collectively everyone can’t be right.
These changes are also pushing and pulling customers more than ever before. As individual consumers we invest a little bit in a new phone or tablet and maybe a gadget and services here and there. Some of these pan out and some don’t. But large companies looking to define themselves in a new era of mobility, bring your own devices, cross-organizational boundaries, and cloud need much more information and a clearer understanding of what and why things have transpired like they have. Discussing the rationale behind choices provides much more context for customers making bets and allows a much more open dialog to compare and contrast choices. This goes way beyond features and gets to the strategy, learning from the past, direction for the future–it is a fine line.
It is too easy to fall back to wanting to know the next products and features. Companies still have secrets. That’s what defines a company relative to competition. As Jeff Bezos commented recently, “sure, I’d like to know Apple’s product roadmap”. To interpret the need for openness as a public roadmap or feature list misses the point—what was missing from the incumbent perspective was a view of what has transpired over the past 5 years and with that understanding a view of what could provide more understanding of how investments are moving forward.
The real question is if incumbents are going to change enough, fast enough, and in a sense disrupt themselves and do so with a clear understanding of what has transpired in the past few years. Or will they take on all the characteristics of “Innovator’s Dilemma” and operate hoping incremental change dampens any effect of big transitions will allow them to weather the storm and return to normal.
To see how significant this transition is, I think it is best to start with Mary Meeker’s always informative “Internet Trends 2014″. The complete report is available and so is the video. There were many interesting data points—the rise of China, the conversion of smartphones from feature phones, the move of OS platforms to Silicon Valley companies, messaging, and more. One slide that sums up the transition along with the challenge showed the growth of tablets relative to PCs with the title “Tablet Units = Growing Faster Than PCs Ever Did…+52%, 2013”.
Because business is a social science and because there are many ways to look at data, no doubt some will challenge this data or conclusions. In fact, IDC just revised their tablet numbers down. Some feel that Tablets are reverting to their role as “media consumption” or lightweight computing devices. That I’m writing this on a tablet (yes one with a keyboard, but one with LTE, 10 hour battery life, weighs nothing, B5 size, etc.) provides my own anecdote about where things are heading.
This growth will change. It might sputter and then increase. There’s no doubt tablets are overtaking notebooks in terms of unit volumes. They are definitely not taking over all notebook workloads. But that would be like saying the growth of email was irrelevant to word-processing because it ignores the growth of the pie and shift in total volume to the new technology. As Steve Jobs said on stage at this conference, the software will catch up. This is happening. Despite what people might think, large numbers of attendees had their tablets at the conference and they were being “productive”.
Just as mainframe companies attempted to point out the shortcomings of PCs as servers, pointing out the shortcomings of tablets is not helpful, especially as tablets continue to gain more and more features of laptops while maintaining their unique characteristics (lightweight, fanless, quality over time, connectivity, reliability, security, apps, etc.)
One more slide from Mary sets the context that dominated the divergence of incumbents and disruptors and that was the view of the market size of each generation of computing, “Each New Computing Cycle = >10x > Installed Base Than Previous Cycle.”
“More than just phones” might lump too many devices into the last data point for some wishing to make the point that things are not changing so much. Let’s be clear—many mainframes still run the most critical systems of the world (I was in a briefing with an insurance company last week that wanted to hire me because I happened to know PL/1!). Today’s laptops have massive utility that isn’t being replaced overnight and probably won’t ever be “replaced”. That’s the Innovator’s Dilemma argument that does not equip either product developers or customers to innovate and prosper during these cycle changes.
Once you get beyond the specifics of what is coming next, which no one should be obliged to answer at #codecon, the dialog that gets to the heart of what is going on is worth having. What was missed? What was learned? What was tried? What did you think of what was tried? What is being done differently? How are big technology changes being thought of in isolation? Relative to existing investments? What point of view does a company have? What led the new company to be formed? What is different about investments being made? How do customers cope with change?
These questions and how they were answered made for quite a contrast between incumbents and disruptors. If you’re interested in per-speaker reports or the full interviews for any of them, please see the re/code site. My intent is not to summarize the sessions but to reflect on the sessions through this lens of forward leaning versus backward looking.
The incumbents of Microsoft, Intel, Comcast and Wal-Mart had a common theme which is that they each face significant challenges in the technology platforms and business models that brought them wildly successful. At the same time, each in my view missed an opportunity to say how they intend to change. In a sense, each asked us to leap to a future with them in leadership but without the detail to support that assertion.
It is key to understand that it is incredibly important for an industry to have large and healthy players operating at scale. In many ways, the startups we love serve as disruptive R&D for larger players and a healthy M&A pipeline is critical for all as evidenced by some of the recent mega-deals and dozens of smaller ones all aimed at the long term evolution of core products.
It is incredibly important for an industry to have large and healthy players operating at scale
Yet, many investments, particularly in hardware and manufacturing, require billions of dollars that can only be made by large companies. Incremental improvements we come to take for granted such as doubling of capacity, improved batteries, thinner devices, more pixels, massive data centers, and so on can only come from huge scale and well-functioning large companies.
At the same time, one look at Meeker’s slide above and one can’t help but notice that these large companies come to define the cycles she represents. Is that a convenient way we recall changes or were strategic changes part of a causal relationship? Don’t be so quick to judge. There’s a significant amount of subtlety and nuance.
Let’s look at some of the specific speakers.
Microsoft’s Satya Nadella and Intel’s Brian Krzanich both sit in the hot seat (the red chairs that define the #codecon set) with the same question so it is worth considering them together—what happened with respect to mobile and tablets. Satya talked about wishing to have taken the bet to build hardware all the way, sooner. Intel talked about the challenges in manufacturing at 14nm, not having the right product relative to power and the need to do better at 10nm. Mossberg kicked off Brian’s interview with the observation that he’s using a laptop half as frequently and using ARM based products a great deal. In a moment of candor, Brian talked about how many at Intel wished that the march towards mobility would have stopped at Ultrabooks and that Intel lacked the right parts to do tablets, which many at Intel did not think tablets would break out beyond consumption. I felt Brian’s comments showed a good acknowledgement about why things didn’t happen. At the same time, collectively the view of a strategy in the near to medium term didn’t come through. In eerily similar approaches, both Intel and Microsoft looked to a future beyond phones and tablets to an internet of things or more personal computing as where they will see greater success. I left both of these sessions feeling there was more to be told about where things are right now and what will happen over the next year or two (again not the features but the strategy—Microsoft and tablets small and large, Intel and mobile or even Chrome and Android). It isn’t that nothing was said, it was that everyone knows where things are today and the speakers know everyone knows, and the upside to keeping things close to the vest seems minimal and equates to “go with the disruptors” at some level.
One must admit that the challenge faced by Wal-Mart’s Doug McMillon is even greater in this audience which has few Walmart regulars (note, I shop at Walmart). In particular, many in this crowd are on the leading edge of home delivery and uber-for-everything and so visiting stores is already a thing of the past. That said, so much of what was said about online commerce felt too much like an expected incumbent response. For example, the idea that the lines are blurring between ecommerce and retail or that it is really hard to measure ecommerce if a person looked up an item on their mobile device before coming to the store (I wondered if there really was a metric that tried to give credit internally to the ecommerce division if someone did that). Ultimately, Doug said “physical still matters and digital makes it more valuable”. Maybe, except the last morning of the show I ordered a wall mount for the Sonos speaker we received at the show (yes elite gifts are part of the elite show) and it beat me home. Yes that is a luxury good and more, but to put forward the notion that ecommerce is still an add-on to physical stores seemed tricky for me.
Comcast’s Brian Roberts not only faces the challenge of cord cutters represented in the audience or the prospects of dealing with questions on net neutrality, but also just the fact that a lot of people have a lot of less than positive feelings about the products and services Comcast offers. When you look at Comcast as an incumbent and consider things like Netflix, Hulu, cord cutting, and more as the disruptive force it is very tough to see the dialog Brian led as satisfying. My feeling was that there is a strong response to keep everything as it is, while putting forward a notion that things are improving. There was a long demonstration of the X1 cable box. Yet in the same session when questioned about net neutrality, Brian said that it is too bad that Netflix should pay a cost of doing business as he has to pay for cableboxes. I think that they love the cablebox (evidence, it seems to be an incredible headache to get cablecards and very costly to switch to TiVo and the rent for cable boxes is pretty high). The fact that they spent 10 minutes doing a demo on the new platform seemed to indicate that—yet the platform has none of the elements of a modern platform relative to apps or openness as was asked by an attendee. The responses to questions about net neutrality seemed to show a strong desire to avoid change while at the same time not acknowledging a changing world and changing needs of what is going on relative to connectivity. The overall dialog around Netflix seemed harsh to me and it failed to consider just how much more pleasant (and modern) Netflix is as a consumer than the X1 experience shown. Disclaimer: I have had really significant problems with Comcast in our new place and having never used them before; this is my first time as a customer. As I have no choice for video or broadband, one could say it is challenging for me to be totally objective.
Each also stuck to revealing little, defending the status quo, and offering a view of the future that is the same but better.
Each of these CEOs and companies have enormously challenging jobs and situations. Having shareholders demanding consistent quarter by quarter results, customers who do not really want change from these service providers but seek change elsewhere, and massive organizations to change all make for the potential of no-win interviews. Yet, each also stuck to revealing little, defending the status quo, and offering a view of the future that is the same but better. My own experience and learning would offer than when facing massive disruptive challenges, engaging in the dialog serves all parties better even though the normal school of thought for the incumbent is to double-down, stick to talking points, and only reveal challenges through the lens of opportunity.
Several CEOs represented the leading edge of disruption. It is super easy to be a fan of disruption and to look at all that is going well with these leaders just as it is easy to look at all the challenges the incumbents face. At the same time, these disruptions are also representative of a new level of frankness and openness about what they face or have faced.
More than the great work these leaders represent, I think it is important to look at how each is communicating and participating in a dialog. One might suggest that when these leaders are under pressure or face challenges of being disrupted they will start to take on the characteristics demonstrated above. I don’t think that is the case, simply because several of these leaders have already faced (or are facing) these challenges in their business. While clearly disruptors have less to lose, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that some of these represent large public companies (not mega cap, but large) and all represent very large customer bases from consumer to enterprise.
It was exciting to see these leaders head to the future, demonstrate a unique point of view, and engage in a two-way dialog about where things are going
For me, it was exciting to watch these interviews and how these leaders took on their own challenges. It was also exciting to see these leaders head to the future, demonstrate a unique point of view, and engage in a two-way dialog about where things are going.
Let’s look at some of these speakers.
Uber’s Travis Kalanick is arguably the most used and mission critical service for the attendees. The love for the service runs deep. Equally deep is the love for how Uber is taking on the government in the regulation of taxis and ride sharing (along with Lyft, an a16z portfolio company). At the same time, Travis faces a lot of questions about his aggressive style and reputation. He didn’t hold back, characterizing the task ahead at Uber as “a political campaign, and the candidate is Uber and the opponent is an asshole named Taxi.” OK, probably a bit colorful. What I loved was how he embraced even the disruption to his own business. After seeing a truly autonomous car from Google the night before we heard the CEO of Uber telling us that self-driving cars are the future, not drivers. Considering that Uber is a marketplace for drivers, this embrace of your own disruption is great to see.
Most people expected a characteristically polite interview by Softbank’s Masayoshi Son-san, but were treated to candor and aggressiveness, though in a very polite way. This would be consistent with the amazing success Softbank and Yahoo BB had in Japan ten plus years ago bringing amazing broadband and low prices to a market easily dominate by the goliaths like NTT (the most visible building from the Shinjuku train station is the DoCoMo tower). Son-san told the story of starting Yahoo BB and “how they had: No experience, No technology, No capital. Just anger.” This was a true disruptor story, much like Uber’s story of realigning city government only at a national scale. While it was not so challenging to be candid about WiMax, Son-san was super clear about the failed technological approach. He was clear about the intention to go after broadband in the US with the same zeal he went after it in Japan.
Salesforce and Workday (Marc Benioff / Aneel Bhusri) together offered an incredibly clear view of disruption at the enterprise software level. If there’s one interview to watch, I would suggest this one because it has so much relevance to how software is made and brought to market from two CEOs who made and brought to market software in a previous generation. These are CEOs learning from their experience who have also engaged the marketplace differently as disruptors. There were many statements that are starting to seem less and less “bold” but nevertheless remain monumentally disruptive: “in a few years no one will run business software on premises”, “I run the company from a smartphone”, “if you’re going to build a cloud app you need to start from a clean sheet of paper—there’s no way around it”, “incumbents are holding on to the past and basically trying to monetize it”, “90% of the company can do all of HR on a smartphone” and so on. There were many profound elements of the dialog that revealed the depth of the strategic and technological shift these leaders are both creating and have experienced. For example, there was a description of competing with an incumbent like SAP who would go to a customer, negotiate a $40M deal to “upgrade” and then wait two years to get the latest features or start to use a SaaS model and the new features just show up. Yes there’s a ton of complexity in there and yes it is horribly disruptive to how businesses operate, but so was the introduction of the PC, client/server (upon which that $40M upgrade was based) and more. Finally, the discussion about being in a “post-server” world resonated with me as I just don’t see it as viable for companies to be building out their own data centers and this session provided a lot of evidence as to what these vendors are doing to make that a realistic assertion. From a format perspective I love the adjacency of these two and wish a couple of the incumbents were paired together.
Dropbox’s Drew Houston brought innovation, competition, and regulatory oversight into focus with his interview. This is another service that many people in the room not only use but rely on and that brings with it a degree of comfort and also a challenge in that the audience knows a lot about the services represented. Not content to simply reiterate what was previously known and said about the company, Drew talked about the genuine frustration he represents as a cloud provider learning about the revelation that the NSA tapped into cloud based services. It would have been easy to lay low but instead made the quip that the “NSA doesn’t send a muffin basket and say welcome”.
Netflix’s Reed Hastings represents learning and the learning from disruption incredibly well and can also be chronicled in his own appearances in the hot seat. Sometimes we forget that Netflix has been a public company for 12 years, to the day of this interview! For many of us it seems like ancient history that we used to get plastic discs in the mail and then return them Monday morning. Netflix is famously known for having disrupted itself and not with grace while on a path to streaming and today’s Orange is the New Black. I found the discussion looking backwards to missed opportunities and disruption absolutely fascinating. Reed talked about how the team would discuss “managing to the point of feeling like your skin crawled” and making decisions that were unbelievably difficult. While given the success right now, perhaps it is less difficult to look backwards at the challenges faced and mistakes made. It was amazing to hear this level of candor. Reed was even candid about something he said just a short time ago about the high price of Netflix stock which he said at the time was too high and represented a euphoria. In contrast to Comcast, Reed was much clearer about the net neutrality issues are playing out—he used a great example of Comcast trying to charge at both ends (both for the consumer and the internet service) by talking about the flow of money through the system. He offered an operational view of “strong net neutrality”. Putting aside the specifics of the issue, the tone of looking forward, candor about the past, expression of a clear point of view, and a view of delivering new products and services along with the inherent risks and challenges comes across as modern and consistent with a new style of leadership.
What comes next?
It might be too easy to read this and conclude big companies are legacy and being disrupted and new companies disrupt, but that would ignore two things.
First, this is a moment in time. While some would say disruption is akin to physics and must happen, there are dominant companies that reinvent themselves. Few even recall that IBM was close to bankruptcy when it reinvented itself from one dominant company to another, albeit in a very different way. And that reinvention progressed through nearly 20 years and returned 7X the broad stock market overall during that time.
Second, companies that disrupt are themselves prone to disruption down the road. We haven’t seen this dynamic play out yet for the companies here (though Netflix might be one). There is also a great deal of learning about how to reinvent and avoid the risk of being locked into a strategy and execution. Google doing the unthinkable of shutting down services or Facebook acquiring very large scale indirect competitors or technology complements are examples of a new generation of leaders acting differently relative to the potential disruption of core businesses.
Nothing is quite inevitable in business, but the potential to fall into familiar patterns is high.
Nothing is quite inevitable in business, but the potential to fall into familiar patterns is high. This past week at #codecon demonstrated the challenges and approaches to the core risk of the technology industry. In technology, the only thing you really do is monetize the work of the past and deliver innovation to the future. How leaders approach this reality is an evolving skill and #codecon allows us all to witness this evolution firsthand.
Every time the topic of tablets versus laptops (and or smartphones) comes up, we end up in another endless debate about scenarios, consumption, productivity, keyboards, mice, screen size, multitasking, and more. In every case the debate centers around the core uses of “PCs” today—and PC is in quotes because the PC itself is a remarkably flexible device that has morphed over the years into many form factors. People study run-rates and trends and try to predict the demise of one over another and so on.
It isn’t so simple. But it also isn’t so binary.
Every disruptive innovation shares (at least) two characteristics. First, the newly introduced technology is more often than not inferior in some key dimensions, while superior in some dimensions that in the current context seem to matter more. Second, despite much consternation, the technology being disrupted is almost certainly going to remain a vital part of the landscape in some form or another for quite some time—either simply because of the long tail of legacy or because it serves a function that is not replicated at all.
What changes, however, is where the emphasis takes place around an ecosystem and with a, usually, broader set of customers. The ecosystem is not a static world and it too plays a vital role in the transition. Where the ecosystem is investing is always a leading indicator of where the transition is heading.
We can look at transitions such as entertainment (theater, radio, film, TV, video, streaming) or transportation (horses, boats, trains, cars, planes) or even storage (removable, hard drives, USB, flash) as examples of where these traits are demonstrated. Computer user-interface moving from characters to GUI to touch shows these traits as well.
The introduction of the iPad, and the modern mobile OS (and smartphones) in general, shows many of these characteristics. The modern OS in combination with new hardware has many characteristics that separate it from the PC era including sealed case (non-extensible hardware), ultra-low power consumption, rich embedded graphics, touch user interface, app store, exclusively wireless connectivity, and more. This is the new platform which is where so much innovation in apps is taking place.
Here is where the debate starts—some of those features are either not valued or true limitations when compared to the vastly more capable PC model. There’s no doubt about that. It is just a fact. Not only does the PC have a wider range and more “powerful” hardware options, but it also benefits from 20 years of software that drives a vast array of processes, devices, workflows, and more. Tablet hardware is still immature relative to “PC standards” and apps do not seem to cover so many of the existing PC scenarios (even if they cover scenarios not even dreamed of or possible on PCs).
Hardware and Software
Two things are still rapidly changing that will account for a much broader transition from the dichotomy of tablet OR laptop today to a world where tablets with modern operating systems begin (or have begun) to replace many scenarios occupied by laptops.
We will soon start to see more innovation in tablets.
First, the hardware in tablets will benefit enormously from Moore’s law. While the pace of changes in smartphones (screen size, cpu, gpu, specs) has been faster than we have seen in tablets, my guess is we will soon start to see more innovation in tablets. In terms of both form factor and specs, tablets have been reasonably static since introduction. There are give or take two screen sizes and fairly modest spec bumps. My guess is that since the same vendors make both smartphones and tablets, the vast amount of energy has been focused on smartphones for now (just as when the PC industry shifted innovation from desktops to laptops and then swung back again to focus on all-in-ones). I suspect we will start to see more screen sizes for tablets and more innovation in peripherals and capabilities, along with specs that benefit from the rapid progress in Moore’s law.
Second, all the hardware innovation in the world isn’t enough to drive new scenarios or even more dramatic replacement scenarios. The amazing innovation in software on smartphones shows what can take place when developers of the world see potential and tap into the power of a new platform.
I wanted to offer two examples of where the transition to tablets has been surprisingly “behind the scenes” and really out of sight, but very interesting from a technical perspective.
Many of us find ourselves in the AT&T store all too often because we’re adding a line, replacing a phone, getting a new SIM or whatever. Over the past year or so, AT&T has aggressively rolled out iPads to replace the in-store PCs that were used for customer service. This is a massive software challenge. The in-store PCs had point of sale capability, bar code readers (for SIMs), and a large array of apps that drove the entire customer engagement (some of these apps ran Windows OpenStep believe it or not).
He kept telling me how frustrating it was to deal with the lack of capabilities of the new tools.
If you happened to visit the store during the early stages of the transition, you would have been able to sense the frustration with the account managers. There were many unfamiliar elements to the new apps on the iPads and worse there seemed to be many things that the desktop tools could do that the iPad apps could not. For example, I got caught trying to merge two accounts and the rep was forced to call the regional call center to do the work and while on hold he kept telling me how frustrating it was to deal with the lack of capabilities of the new tools. At the same time, the iPad had cool integration with portable bar code readers, the reps could easily show you what is on the screen to verify information (like picking a new phone number) and so on.
The transition is well underway now and I don’t think folks notice any more.
Today I spent a few hours with my friendly Comcast technician while he diagnosed something faulty with our cable signal. While he has a fancy signal meter, most of the work he does is actually adjusting things via a remote app on an iPad. Comcast technicians (as I learned, the ones in vans but not “bucket trucks”) were recently issued iPads. Sure enough during the visit he was on the phone to a central office and was saying “I have an iPad now and so without my PC I’m not able to get that measurement”.
The tech said, “I have an iPad now and so without my PC I’m not able to get that measurement”.
I was having flashbacks to the frustrated AT&T reps. Turns out this technician used to have a PC and ran the same software as the tech at the other end of the phone (and in the bucket trucks). They are moving techs to iPads because they do not have to carry chargers; they are more resilient when dropped; and the integrated Verizon connectivity all make for a far more convenient service tool. Plus things like entering the MAC address become much easier with bar code readers and the ability to use a much more agile form factor, as one example.
The conversation I had with a tech (always the anthropologist) was fun. He said they have a whole tracking and feedback process that helps them to prioritize what features the software folks need to add to the apps being used in the field. Turns out, I’m guessing, they built some pretty elaborate desktop software that did just about everything since it was used on the ground and in the data center, but they likely had little understanding of just what was used and how often. The creation of new apps will drive a new level of customer service and technician capabilities, even if there are some hiccups along the way.
These two examples are hard core line of business tools. We’re seeing the same thing in the line of business tools used by folks at all sorts of companies big and small. The new generation of mobile-first SaaS tools make it far easier to create “documents” for sharing and collaboration, access business information, or participate in business services from CRM to accounting to benefits. The tools these are supplanting were developed over a decade and have tons of features and optimizations but lack the mobility and internet access that is so highly valued in a modern workplace. The transition will have some hiccups but is happening.
Along with these tools, so many of the tools for creation and production that are PC based on being reimagined and recast for modern work. We can see this revolution in Adobe’s work on photography for professionals with tablets, Paper and Penci from fiftythree, and of course the long list of productivity tools we talk about often on this blog. These tools do less, but they also do more. When combined with tablets and smartphones on modern platforms they enable a new view on the work and scenarios.
The characterization of tablets as “neither here nor there” or “in between tablet and a laptop” misses the reality that the modern nature of tablet platforms—both hardware and software—will drive innovation and subsequent transition for many many scenarios from traditional laptop platforms to tablet platforms. We’re in the middle period where this is happening—just as when people said cars were too expensive for the masses and would not be mainstream or when the GUI interface lacked the hardware horsepower and “keystroke productivity” to replace character based tools.
New hardware and new software will surface new capabilities and scenarios not previously possible (or imagined).
The traditional laptop will power hundreds of millions of endpoints for a very long time. But as the two examples here show, even in the most hardcore worlds where device integration meets custom software, there is a transformation and transition taking place. New hardware and new software will surface new capabilities and scenarios not previously possible (or imagined). It won’t be smooth and it won’t please everyone immediately, but it is happening–just as both of those same scenarios transitioned from character to GUI.
It really is about the software. That change is happening all around us.
I was talking with a founder/CEO of an enterprise startup about what it is like to disrupt a sizable incumbent. In the case we were talking about the disrupting technology was losing traction and the incumbent was regaining control of the situation, back off their heels, and generally felt like they had fended off the “attack” on a core business. This causes a lot of consternation at the disrupting startup as deals aren’t won, reviews and analyst reports swing the wrong way, and folks start to question the direction. If there really is a product/market fit, then hold on and persevere because almost always the disruption is still going to happen. Let’s look at why.
The most important thing to realize about a large successful company reacting to a disruptive market entry is that every element of the company just wants to return to “normal” as quickly as possible. It is that simple.
Every action about being disrupted is dictated by a desire to avoid changing things and to maintain the status quo.
If the disruption is a product feature, the motion is figuring out how to tell customers the feature isn’t that important (best case) or how to quickly add something along the lines of the feature and move on (worst case). If the disruption is a pricing change then every effort is about how to “manage customers” without actually changing the price. If the disruption is a new and seemingly important adjacent product, then the actions focus on how to point out that such a product isn’t really necessary. Across the spectrum of potential activities, it is why the early competitive responses are often dismissive or outwardly ignore the challenger. Aside from the normal desire to avoid validating a new market entry by commenting, it takes a lot of time for a large enterprise to go through the work to formulate a response and gain consensus. Therefore an articulate way of changing very little has a lot of appeal.
Status quo is the ultimate goal of the incumbent.
Once a disruptive product gains enough traction that a more robust response is required, the course of action is almost always one that is designed to reduce changes to plans, minimize effort overall, and to do just enough to “tie”. Why is that? Because in a big company “versus” a small company, enterprise customers tend to see “a tie as a win to the incumbent”. Customers have similar views about having their infrastructure disrupted and wish to minimize change, so goals are aligned. The idea of being able to check off that a given scenario is handled by what you already own makes things much easier.
Keep in mind that in any organization, large or small, everyone is at or beyond capacity. There’s no bench, no free cycles. So any change in immediate work necessarily means something isn’t going to get done. In a large organization these challenges are multiplied by scale. People worry about their performance reviews; managers worry about the commitments to other groups; sales people worry about quarterly quotas. All of these worries are extremely difficult to mitigate because they cross layers of managers and functions.
As much as a large team or leader would like to “focus” or “wave a wand” to get folks to see the importance of a crisis, the reality of doing so is itself a massive change effort that takes a lot of time.
This means that the actions taken often follow a known pattern:
- Campaign. The first thing that takes place is a campaign of words and positioning. The checklist of features, the benefits of the existing product, the breadth of features of the incumbent compared to the new product, and so on. If the new product is cheaper, then the focus turns to value. Almost always the campaign emphasizes the depth, breadth, reliability, and comfort of the incumbent’s offer. A campaign might also be quite negative and focus on a fear, compatibility with existing infrastructure, or conventional wisdom weakness of a disruptor, or the might introduce a pretty big leap of repositioning of the incumbent product. A good example of this is how on-premises server products have competed with SaaS by highlighting the lack of flexibility or potential security issues around the cloud. This approach is quick to wind up and easy to wind down. Once it starts to work you roll it out all over the world and execute. Once the deals are won back then the small tiger team that created the campaign goes back to articulating the product as originally intended, aka normal.
- Partnership. Quite often there can be a competitive response of best practices or a third-party tool/add-on that appears to provide some similar functionality. The basic idea is to use someone else to offer the benefit articulated by a disruptive product. Early in the SaaS competition, the on-premises companies were somewhat quick to partner with “hosting” companies who would simply build out a dedicated rack of servers and run the traditional software “as a service”. This repotting plants approach to SaaS has the benefit that once the immediate crisis is mitigated, either the need to actually offer and support the partnership ends or the company just becomes committed to this new sales channel for existing products. Again, everything else continues as it was.
- Special effort. Every once in a while the pressure is so great internally to compete that the engineering team signs up for a “one off” product change or special feature. Because the engineering team was already booked, a special effort is often something carefully negotiated and minimized in scope and effort. Engineering minimizes it internally to avoid messing up dependencies and other features. Sales will be specific in what they expect the result to do because while the commitment is being made they will likely begin to articulate this to red-hot customer situations. At the extreme, it is not uncommon for the engineering team to suggest to the sales organization that a consultant or third-party can use some form of extensibility in the product to implement something that looks like the missing work. The implications of doing enterprise work in a way that minimizes impact is that, well, the impact is minimized. Without the proper architecture or an implementation at the right level in the stack, the effort ultimately looks incomplete or like a one-off. Almost all the on-premise products attempting to morph into cloud products exhibit this in the form of features that used to be there simply not being available in the “SaaS version”. With enough wins, it is almost likely that the special effort feature doesn’t ever get used. Again, the customer is just as likely to be happy with the status quo.
All of these typical responses have the attribute that they can be ignored by the vast majority of resources on a business. Almost no one has to change what they are doing while the business is responding to a disruptive force. Large incumbents love when they can fend off competitors with minimal change.
Large incumbents love when they can fend off competitors with minimal change.
Once the initial wave of competitive wins settles in and the disruptive products lose, there is much rejoicing. The teams just get back to what they were doing and declare victory. Since most of the team didn’t change anything, folks just assume that this was just another competitor with inferior products, technology, approaches that their superior product fended off. Existing customers are happy. All is good.
Or is it?
This is exactly where the biggest opportunity exists for a disruptive market entry. The level of complacency that settles into an incumbent after the first round of victories is astounding. There’s essentially a reinforcing feedback loop because there was little or no dip in revenue (in fact if revenue was growing before then it still is), product usage is still there, customers go back to asking for features the same as they were before, sales people are making quota, and so on. Things went back to normal for the incumbent.
In fact, just about every disruption happens this way–the first round or first approaches don’t quite take hold.
Why is this?
- Product readiness can improve. Obviously the most common is that the disruptive product simply isn’t ready. The feature set, scale, enterprise controls, or other attributes are deficient. A well-run new product will have done extensive early customer work knowing what is missing and will balance launching with these deficiencies and with the ability to continue to develop the product. In a startup environment, a single company rarely gets a second shot with customers so calibrating readiness is critical. Relative to the broader category of disruption, the harsh reality is that if the disruptor’s idea or approach is the right one but the entry into the market was premature, the learning will apply to the next entry. That’s why the opportunity for disruption is still there. It is why time to market is not always the advantage and being able to apply learning from failures (your own or another entry) can be so valuable.
- Missing ingredient gets added. Often a disruptive product makes a forward-looking bet on some level of enterprise infrastructure or capability as a requirement for the new product to take hold. The incumbent latches on to this missing ingredient and uses it to create an overall state of lack of readiness. If there’s one thing that disruptors know, it is not to bet against Moore’s law. If your product takes more compute, more storage, or more bandwidth, these are most definitely short-term issues. Obviously there’s no room for sloppy work, but by and large time is on your side. So much of the disruption around mobile computing was slowed down by the enterprise issues around managing budgets and allocation of “mobile phones”. Companies did not see it as likely that even better phones would become essential for life outside of work and overwhelm the managed phone process. Similarly, the lack of high-speed mobile networks was seen as a barrier, but all the while the telcos are spending billions to build them out.
- Conventional wisdom will change. One of the most fragile elements of change are the mindsets of those that need to change. This is even more true in enterprise computing. In a world where the average tenure of a CIO is constantly under pressure, where budgets are always viewed with skepticism, and where the immediate needs far exceed resources and time, making the wrong choice can be very costly. Thus the conventional wisdom plays an important part in the timeline for a disruption taking hold. From the PC to the GUI to client/server, to the web, to the cloud, to acceptance of open source each of these went through a period where conventional wisdom was that these were inappropriate for the enterprise. Then one day we all wake up to a world where the approach is required for the enterprise. The new products that are forward-looking and weather the negatives wishing to maintain the status quo get richly rewarded when the conventional wisdom changes.
- Legacy products can’t change. Ultimately the best reason to persevere is because the technology products you’re disrupting simply aren’t going to be suited to the new world (new approach, new scenarios, new technologies). When you re-imagine how something should be, you have an inherent advantage. The very foundation of technology disruption continues to point out that incumbents with the most to lose have the biggest challenges leading through generational changes. Many say the enterprise software world, broadly speaking, is testing these challenges today.
All of these are why disruption has the characteristic of seeming to take a much longer time to take hold than expected, but when it does take hold it happens very rapidly. One day a product is ready for primetime. One day a missing ingredient is ubiquitous. One day conventional wisdom just changes. And legacy products really struggle to change enough (sometimes in business or sometimes in technology) to be “all in” players in the new world.
Of course all this hinges on an idea plus execution of a disruptive idea. All the academic theory and role-playing in the world cannot offer wisdom on knowing if you’re on to something. That’s where the team and entrepreneur’s intuition, perseverance, and adaptability to new data are the most valuable assets.
The opportunity and ability to disrupt the enterprise takes patience and more often than not several attempts, by one or more players learning and adjusting the overall approach. The intrinsic strengths of the incumbent means that new products can usually be defended against for a short time. At the same time the organization and operation of a large and successful company also means that there is near certainty that a subsequent wave of disruption will be stronger, better, and more likely to take hold simply because of the desire for the incumbent to get back to “normal”.
–Steven Sinofsky (@stevesi)
Innovation and disruption are the hallmarks of the technology world, and hardly a moment passes when we are not thinking, doing, or talking about these topics. While I was speaking with some entrepreneurs recently on the topic, the question kept coming up: “If we’re so aware of disruption, then why do successful products (or companies) keep getting disrupted?”
Good question, and here’s how I think about answering it.
As far back as 1962, Everett Rogers began his groundbreaking work defining the process and diffusion of innovation. Rogers defined the spread of innovation in the stages of knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation and confirmation.
Those powerful concepts, however, do not fully describe disruptive technologies and products, and the impact on the existing technology base or companies that built it. Disruption is a critical element of the evolution of technology — from the positive and negative aspects of disruption a typical pattern emerges, as new technologies come to market and subsequently take hold.
A central question to disruption is whether it is inevitable or preventable. History would tend toward inevitable, but an engineer’s optimism might describe the disruption that a new technology can bring more as a problem to be solved.
Four Stages of Disruption
For incumbents, the stages of innovation for a technology product that ultimately disrupt follow a pattern that is fairly well known. While that doesn’t grant us the predictive powers to know whether an innovation will ultimately disrupt, we can use a model to understand what design choices to prioritize, and when. In other words, the pattern is likely necessary, but not sufficient to fend off disruption. Value exists in identifying the response and emotions surrounding each stage of the innovation pattern, because, as with disruption itself, the actions/reactions of incumbents and innovators play important roles in how parties progress through innovation. In some ways, the response and emotions to undergoing disruption are analogous to the classic stages of grieving.
Rather than the five stages of grief, we can describe four stages that comprise theinnovation pattern for technology products: Disruption of incumbent; rapid and linear evolution; appealing convergence; and complete reimagination. Any product line or technology can be placed in this sequence at a given time.
The pattern of disruption can be thought of as follows, keeping in mind that at any given time for any given category, different products and companies are likely at different stages relative to some local “end point” of innovation.
Stage One: Disruption of Incumbent
A moment of disruption is where the conversation about disruption often begins, even though determining that moment is entirely hindsight. (For example, when did BlackBerry get disrupted by the iPhone, film by digital imaging or bookstores by Amazon?) A new technology, product or service is available, and it seems to some to be a limited, but different, replacement for some existing, widely used and satisfactory solution. Most everyone is familiar with this stage of innovation. In fact, it could be argued that most are so familiar with this aspect that collectively our industry cries “disruption” far more often than is actually the case.
From a product development perspective, choosing whether a technology is disruptive at a potential moment is key. If you are making a new product, then you’re “betting the business” on a new technology — and doing so will be counterintuitive to many around you. If you have already built a business around a successful existing product, then your “bet the business” choice is whether or not to redirect efforts to a new technology. While difficult to prove, most would generally assert that new technologies that are subsequently disruptive are bet on by new companies first. The very nature of disruption is such that existing enterprises see more downside risk in betting the company than they see upside return in a new technology. This is the innovator’s dilemma.
The incumbent’s reactions to potential technology disruptions are practically cliche. New technologies are inferior. New products do not do all the things existing products do, or are inefficient. New services fail to address existing needs as well as what is already in place. Disruption can seem more expensive because the technologies have not yet scaled, or can seem cheaper because they simply do less. Of course, the new products are usually viewed as minimalist or as toys, and often unrelated to the core business. Additionally, business-model disruption has similar analogues relative to margins, channels, partners, revenue approaches and more.
The primary incumbent reaction during this stage is to essentially ignore the product or technology — not every individual in an organization, but the organization as a whole often enters this state of denial. One of the historical realities of disruption is uncovering the “told you so” evidence, which is always there, because no matter what happens, someone always said it would. The larger the organization, the more individuals probably sent mail or had potential early-stage work that could have avoided disruption, at least in their views (see “Disruption and Woulda, Coulda, Shoulda” and the case of BlackBerry). One of the key roles of a company is to make choices, and choosing change to a more risky course versus defense of the current approaches are the very choices that hamstring an organization.
There are dozens of examples of disruptive technologies and products. And the reactions (or inactions) of incumbents are legendary. One example that illustrates this point would be the introduction of the “PC as a server.” This has all of the hallmarks of disruption. The first customers to begin to use PCs as servers — for application workloads such as file sharing, or early client/server development — ran into incredible challenges relative to the mini/mainframe computing model. While new PCs were far more flexible and less expensive, they lacked the reliability, horsepower and tooling to supplant existing models. Those in the mini/mainframe world could remain comfortable observing the lack of those traits, almost dismissing PC servers as not “real servers,” while they continued on their path further distancing themselves from the capabilities of PC servers, refining their products and businesses for a growing base of customers. PCs as servers were simply toys.
At the same time, PC servers began to evolve and demonstrate richer models for application development (rich client front-ends), lower cost and scalable databases, and better economics for new application development. With the rapidly increasing demand for computing solutions to business problems, this wave of PC servers fit the bill. Soon the number of new applications written in this new way began to dwarf development on “real servers,” and the once-important servers became legacy relative to PC-based servers for those making the bet or shift. PC servers would soon begin to transition from disruption to broad adoption, but first the value proposition needed to be completed.
Stage Two: Rapid Linear Evolution
Once an innovative product or technology begins rapid adoption, the focus becomes “filling out” the product. In this stage, the product creators are still disruptors, innovating along the trajectory they set for themselves, with a strong focus on early-adopter customers, themselves disruptors. The disruptors are following their vision. The incumbents continue along their existing and successful trajectory, unknowingly sealing their fate.
This stage is critically important to understand from a product-development perspective. As a disruptive force, new products bring to the table a new way of looking at things — a counterculture, a revolution, an insurgency. The heroic efforts to bring a product or service to market (and the associated business models) leave a lot of room left to improve, often referred to as “low-hanging fruit.” The path from where one is today to the next six, 12, 18 months is well understood. You draw from the cutting-room floor of ideas that got you to where you are. Moving forward might even mean fixing or redoing some of the earlier decisions made with less information, or out of urgency.
Generally, your business approach follows the initial plan, as well, and has analogous elements of insurgency. Innovation proceeds rapidly in this point. Your focus is on the adopters of your product — your fellow disruptors (disrupting within their context). You are adding features critical to completing the scenario you set out to develop.
To the incumbent leaders, you look like you are digging in your heels for a losing battle. In their view, your vector points in the wrong direction, and you’re throwing good money after bad. This only further reinforces the view of disruptors that they are heading in the right direction. The previous generals are fighting the last war, and the disruptors have opened up a new front. And yet, the traction in the disruptor camp becomes undeniable. The incumbent begins to mount a response. That response is somewhere between dismissive and negative, and focuses on comparing the products by using the existing criteria established by the incumbent. The net effect of this effort is to validate the insurgency.
Stage Three: Appealing Convergence
As the market redefinition proceeds, the category of a new product starts to undergo a subtle redefinition. No longer is it enough to do new things well; the market begins to call for the replacement of the incumbent technology with the new technology. In this stage, the entire market begins to “wake up” to the capabilities of the new product.
As the disruptive product rapidly evolves, the initial vision becomes relatively complete (realizing that nothing is ever finished, but the scenarios overall start to fill in). The treadmill of rapidly evolving features begins to feel somewhat incremental, and relatively known to the team. The business starts to feel saturated. Overall, the early adopters are now a maturing group, and a sense of stability develops.
Looking broadly at the landscape, it is clear that the next battleground is to go after the incumbent customers who have not made the move. In other words, once you’ve conquered the greenfield you created, you check your rearview mirror and look to pick up the broad base of customers who did not see your product as market-ready or scenario-complete. To accomplish this, you look differently at your own product and see what is missing relative to the competition you just left in the dust. You begin to realize that all those things your competitor had that you don’t may not be such bad ideas after all. Maybe those folks you disrupted knew something, and had some insights that your market category could benefit from putting to work.
In looking at many disruptive technologies and disruptors, the pattern of looking back to move forward is typical. One can almost think of this as a natural maturing; you promise never to do some of the things your parents did, until one day you find yourself thinking, “Oh my, I’ve become my parents.” The reason that products are destined to converge along these lines is simply practical engineering. Even when technologies are disrupted, the older technologies evolved for a reason, and those reasons are often still valid. The disruptors have the advantage of looking at those problems and solving them in their newly defined context, which can often lead to improved solutions (easier to deploy, cheaper, etc.) At the same time, there is also a risk of second-system syndrome that must be carefully monitored. It is not uncommon for the renegade disruptors, fresh off the success they have been seeing, to come to believe in broader theories of unification or architecture and simply try to get too much done, or to lose the elegance of the newly defined solution.
Stage Four: Complete Reimagination
The last stage of technology disruption is when a category or technology is reimagined from the ground up. While one can consider this just another disruption, it is a unique stage in this taxonomy because of the responses from both the legacy incumbent and the disruptor.
Reimagining a technology or product is a return to first principles. It is about looking at the underlying assumptions and essentially rethinking all of them at once. What does it mean to capture an image,provide transportation, share computation, search the Web, and more? The reimagined technology often has little resemblance to the legacy, and often has the appearance of even making the previous disruptive technology appear to be legacy. The melding of old and new into a completely different solution often creates whole new categories of products and services, built upon a base of technology that appears completely different.
To those who have been through the first disruption, their knowledge or reference frame seems dated. There is also a feeling of being unable to keep up. The words are known, but the specifics seem like rocket science. Where there was comfort in the convergence of ideas, the newly reimagined world seems like a whole new generation, and so much more than a competitor.
In software, one way to think of this is generational. The disruptors studied the incumbents in university, and then went on to use that knowledge to build a better mousetrap. Those in university while the new mousetrap was being built benefited from learning from both a legacy and new perspective, thus seeing again how to disrupt. It is often this fortuitous timing that defines generations in technologies.
Reimagining is important because the breakthroughs so clearly subsume all that came before. What characterizes a reimagination most is that it renders the criteria used to evaluate the previous products irrelevant. Often there are orders of magnitude difference in cost, performance, reliability, service and features. Things are just wildly better. That’s why some have referred to this as the innovator’s curse. There’s no time to bask in the glory of the previous success, as there’s a disruptor following right up on your heels.
A recent example is cloud computing. Cloud computing is a reimagination ofboth the mini/mainframe and PC-server models. By some accounts, it is a hybrid of those two, taking the commodity hardware of the PC world and the thin client/data center view of the mainframe world. One would really have to squint in order to claim it is just that, however, as the fundamental innovation in cloud computing delivers entirely new scale, reliability and flexibility, at a cost that upends both of those models. Literally every assumption of the mainframe and client/server computing was revisited, intentionally or not, in building modern cloud systems.
For the previous incumbent, it is too late. There’s no way to sprinkle some reimagination on your product. The logical path, and the one most frequently taken, is to “mine the installed base,” and work hard to keep those customers happy and minimize the mass defections from your product. The question then becomes one of building an entirely new product that meets these new criteria, but from within the existing enterprise. The number of times this has been successfully accomplished is diminishingly small, but there will always be exceptions to the rule.
For the previous disruptor and new leader, there is a decision point that is almost unexpected. One might consider the drastic — simply learn from what you previously did, and essentially abandon your work and start over using what you learned. Or you could be more incremental, and get straight to the convergence stage with the latest technologies. It feels like the ground is moving beneath you. Can you converge rapidly, perhaps revisiting more assumptions, and show more flexibility to abandon some things while doing new things? Will your product architecture and technologies sustain this type of rethinking? Your customer base is relatively new, and was just feeling pretty good about winning, so the pressure to keep winning will be high. Will you do more than try to recast your work in this new light?
The relentless march of technology change comes faster than you think.
So What Can You Do?
Some sincerely believe that products, and thus companies, disrupt and then are doomed to be disrupted. Like a Starship captain when the shields are down, you simply tell all hands to brace themselves, and then see what’s left after the attack. Business and product development, however, are social sciences. There are no laws of nature, and nothing is certain to happen. There are patterns, which can be helpful signposts, or can blind you to potential actions. This is what makes the technology industry, and the changes technology bring to other industries, so exciting and interesting.
The following table summarizes the stages of disruption and the typical actions and reactions at each stage:
|Disruption of Incumbent||Introduces new product with a distinct point of view, knowing it does not solve all the needs of the entire existing market, but advances the state of the art in technology and/or business.||New product or service is not relevant to existing customers or market, a.k.a. “deny.”|
|Rapid linear evolution||Proceeds to rapidly add features/capabilities, filling out the value proposition after initial traction with select early adopters.||Begins to compare full-featured product to new product and show deficiencies, a.k.a. “validate.”|
|Appealing Convergence||Sees opportunity to acquire broader customer base by appealing to slow movers. Sees limitations of own new product and learns from what was done in the past, reflected in a new way. Potential risk is being leapfrogged by even newer technologies and business models as focus turns to “installed base” of incumbent.||Considers cramming some element of disruptive features to existing product line to sufficiently demonstrate attention to future trends while minimizing interruption of existing customers, a.k.a. “compete.” Potential risk is failing to see the true value or capabilities of disruptive products relative to the limitations of existing products.|
|Complete Reimagining||Approaches a decision point because new entrants to the market can benefit from all your product has demonstrated, without embracing the legacy customers as done previously. Embrace legacy market more, or keep pushing forward?||Arguably too late to respond, and begins to define the new product as part of a new market, and existing product part of a larger, existing market, a.k.a. “retreat.”|
Considering these stages and reactions, there are really two key decision points to be tuned-in to:
When you’re the incumbent, your key decision is to choose carefully what you view as disruptive or not. It is to the benefit of every competitor to claim they are disrupting your products and business. Creating this sort of chaos is something that causes untold consternation in a large organization. Unfortunately, there are no magic answers for the incumbent.
The business team needs to develop a keen understanding of the dynamics of competitive offerings, and know when a new model can offer more to customers and partners in a different way. More importantly, it must avoid an excess attachment to today’s measures of success.
The technology and product team needs to maintain a clinical detachment from the existing body of work to evaluate if something new is better, while also avoiding the more common technology trap of being attracted to the next shiny object.
When you’re the disruptor, your key decision point is really when and if to embrace convergence. Once you make the choices — in terms of business model or product offering — to embrace the point of view of the incumbent, you stand to gain from the bridge to the existing base of customers.
Alternatively, you create the potential to lose big to the next disruptor who takes the best of what you offer and leapfrogs the convergence stage with a truly reimagined product. By bridging to the legacy, you also run the risk of focusing your business and product plans on the customers least likely to keep pushing you forward, or those least likely to be aggressive and growing organizations. You run the risk of looking backward more than forward.
For everyone, timing is everything. We often look at disruption in hindsight, and choose disruptive moments based on product availability (or lack thereof). In practice, products require time to conceive, iterate and execute, and different companies will work on these at different paces. Apple famously talked about the 10-year project that was the iPhone, with many gaps, and while the iPad appears a quick successor, it, too, was part of that odyssey. Sometimes a new product appears to be a response to a new entry, but in reality it was under development for perhaps the same amount of time as another entry.
There are many examples of this path to disruption in technology businesses. While many seem “classic” today, the players at the time more often than not exhibited the actions and reactions described here.
As a social science, business does not lend itself to provable operational rules. As appealing as disruption theory might be, the context and actions of many parties create unique circumstances each and every time. There is no guarantee that new technologies and products will disrupt incumbents, just as there is no certainty that existing companies must be disrupted. Instead, product leaders look to patterns, and model their choices in an effort to create a new path.
Stages of Disruption In Practice
Digital imaging. Mobile imaging reimagined a category that disrupted film (always available, low-quality versus film), while converging on the historic form factors and usage of film cameras. In parallel, there is a wave of reimagination of digital imaging taking place that fundamentally changes imaging using light field technology, setting the stage for a potential leapfrog scenario.
- Retail purchasing. Web retailers disrupted physical retailers with selection, convenience, community, etc., ultimatelyconverging on many elements of traditional retailers (physical retail presence, logistics, house brands).
- Travel booking. Online travel booking is disrupting travel agents, then converging on historic models of aggregation and package deals.
- Portable music. From the Sony Walkman as a disruptor to the iPod and MP3 players, to mobile phones subsuming this functionality, and now to streaming playback, portable music has seen the disruptors get disrupted and incumbents seemingly stopped in their tracks over several generations. The change in scenarios enabled by changing technology infrastructure (increased storage, increased bandwidth, mobile bandwidth and more) have made this a very dynamic space.
- Urban transport. Ride sharing, car sharing, and more disruptive traditional ownership of vehicles or taxi services are in the process of converging models (such as Uber adding UberX.
- Productivity. Tools such as Quip, Box, Haiku Deck, Lucidchart, and more are being pulled by customers beyond early adopters to be compatible with existing tools and usage patterns. In practice, these tools are currently iterating very rapidly along their self-defined disruptive path. Some might suggest that previous disruptors in the space (OpenOffice, Zoho, perhaps even Google Docs) chose to converge with the existing market too soon, as a strategic misstep.
- Movie viewing. Netflix and others, as part of cord-cutting, with disruptive, low-priced, all-you-can-consume on-demand plans and producing their own content. Previous disruptors such as HBO are working to provide streaming and similar services, while constrained by existing business models and relationships.
- Messaging/communications apps. SMS, which many consider disruptive to 2000-era IM, is being challenged by much richer interactions that disrupt the business models of carrier SMS and feature sets afforded by SMS.
- Network infrastructure. Software-defined networking and cloud computing are reimagining the category of networking infrastructure, with incumbent players attempting to benefit from these shifts in the needs of customers. Incumbents at different levels are looking to adopt the model, while some providers see it as fundamentally questioning their assumptions.
With the latest pivot for Blackberry much has been said about disruption and what it can do to companies. The story, Inside the fall of BlackBerry: How the smartphone inventor failed to adapt, by Sean Silcoff, Jacquie Mcnish and Steve Ladurantaye in The Globe and Mail is a wonderful account.
Disruption has a couple of characteristics that make it fun to talk about. While it is happening even with a chorus of people claiming it is happening, it is actually very difficult to see. After it has happened the chorus of “told you so” grows even louder and more matter of fact. After the fact, everyone has a view of what could have been done to “prevent” disruption. Finally, the description of disruption tends to lose all of the details leading up to the failure as things get characterized at the broad company level or a simple characteristic (keyboard v. touch) when the situation is far more complex. Those nuances are what product folks deal with day to day and where all the learning can be found.
Like many challenges in business, there’s no easy solution and no pattern to follow. The decision moments, technology changes, and business realities are all happening to people that have the same skills and backgrounds as the chorus, but the real-world constraints of actually doing something about them.
The case of Blackberry is interesting because the breadth of disruptive forces is so great. It is not likely that a case like this will be seen again for a while–a case where a company has such an incredible position of strength in technology and business gained over a relatively short time and then essentially erased in a short time.
I loved my Blackberry. The first time I used one was before they were released (because there was integration with Outlook I was lucky enough to be using one some time in 1998–I even read the entire DOJ filing against Microsoft on one while stopped on the tarmac at JFK). Using the original 850 was a moment when you immediately felt propelled into the future. Using one felt like the first time I saw a graphical interface (Alto) or a GPS. Upon using one you just knew our technology lives would be different.
What went wrong is almost exactly the opposite of what went right and that’s what makes this such an interesting story and unbelievably difficult challenge for those involved. Even today I look at what went on and think of how galactic the challenges were for that amazing group of people that transported us all to the future with one product.
When you build a product you make a lot of assumptions about the state of the art of technology, the best business practices, and potential customer usage/behavior. Any new product that is even little bit revolutionary makes these choices at an instinctual level–no matter what news stories you read about research or surveys or whatever, I think we all know that there’s a certain gut feeling that comes into play.
This is especially the case for products that change our collective world view.
Whether made deliberately or not these assumptions play a crucial role in how a product evolves over time. I’ve never seen a new product developed where the folks wrote down a long list of assumptions. I wouldn’t even know where to start–so many of them are not even thought through and represent just an engineer or product manager “state of the art”, “best practice”, or “this is what I know”.
It turns out these assumptions, implicit or explicit, become your competitive advantage and allow you to take the market by storm.
But then along come technology advances, business model changes, or new customer behaviors and seemingly overnight your assumptions are invalidated.
In a relatively simple product (note, no product is simple to the folks making it) these assumptions might all be within the domain. Christensen famously studied the early days of the disk drive industry. To many of us these assumptions are all contained within one system or component and it is hard to see how disruption could take hold. Fast forward and we just assume solid-state storage, yet even this transition as obvious as it is to us, requires a whole new world view for people who engineer spinning disks.
In a complex product like the entirety of the Blackberry experience there are assumptions that cross hardware, software, communications networks, channel relationships, business models and more. When you bring all these together into a single picture one realizes the enormity of what was accomplished.
It is instructive to consider the many assumptions or ingredients of Blackberry success that go beyond the popular “keyboard v. touch”. In thinking about my own experience with the product, the following list just a few things that were essentially revisited by the iPhone from the perspective of the Blackberry device/team:
- Keyboard to touch. The most visible difference and most easily debated is this change. From crackberry thumbs to contests over who could type faster, your keyboard was clearly a major innovation. The move to touch would challenge you in technology, behavior, and more.
- Small (b&w) screens to large color. Closely connected with the shift to touch was a change in perspective that consuming information on a bigger screen would trump the use of the real estate for (arguably) more efficient input. Your whole notion of industrial design, supply chain, OS, and more would be challenged. As an aside, the power consumption of large screens immediately seemed like a non-starter to a team insanely focused on battery life.
- GPRS to 3G then LTE. Your heritage in radios, starting with the pager network, placed a premium on using the lowest power/bandwidth radio and focusing on efficiency therein. The iPhone, while 2G early, quickly turned around a game changing 3G device. You had been almost dragged into using the newer higher powered radios because your focus had been to treat radio usage as a premium resource.
- Minimize bandwidth to assume bandwidth is free. Your focus on reducing bytes over the wire was met with a device that just assumed bytes would be “free” or at least easily purchased. Many of the early comments on the iPhone focused on this but few assumed the way the communications companies would respond to an appetite for bandwidth. Imagine thinking how sloppy the iPhone was with bandwidth usage and how fast the battery would drain. Assuming a specific resource is high cost is often a path to disruption when someone makes a different assumption.
- No general web support v. general web support. Despite demand, the Blackberry avoided offered generalized web browsing support. The partnership with carriers also precluded this given their concern about network responsiveness and capacity. Again, few would have assumed a network buildout that would support mobile browsing the way it does today. The disruptor had the advantage of growing slowly (relatively) compared to flipping a switch on a giant installed base.
- WiFi as “present” to nearly ubiquitous. The physics of WiFi coverage (along with power consumption, chip surface area and more) assumed WiFi would be expensive and hard to find. Even with whole city WiFi projects in early 2000’s people didn’t see WiFi as a big part of the solution. Few thought about the presence of WiFi at home and new usage scenarios or that every urban setting, hotel, airport, and more would have WiFi. Even the carriers built out WiFi to offload traffic and include it for free in their plans. The elegant and seamless integration of WiFi on the iPhone became a quick advantage.
- Device update/mgmt by tethering to off air. Blackberry required tethering for some routine operations and for many the only way to integrate corporate mail was to keep a PC running all the time. The PC was an integral part of the Blackberry experience for many. While the iPhone was tethered for music and videos, the presence of WiFi and march towards PC-free experiences was an early assumption in the architecture that just took time to play out.
- Business to consumer. Your Blackberry was clearly a business device. Through much of the period of high success consumers flocked to devices like the SideKick. While there was some consumer success, you anchored in business scenarios from Exchange and Notes integration to network security. The iPhone comes along and out of the gate is aimed at consumers with a camera, MMS, and more. This disruption hits at the hardware, the software, the service integration, and even how the device is sold at carriers.
- Data center based service to broad set of cloud based services. Your connection to the enterprise was anchored in a server that business operated. This was a significant business upside as well as a key part of the value proposition for business. This server became a source for valuable business information propagated to the Blackberry (rather than use the web). The absence of an iPhone server seemed like a huge opportunity yet in fact it turned into an asset in terms of spreading the device. Instead the iPhone relied on the web (and subsequently apps) to deliver services rather than programmed and curated services.
- Deep channel partnership/revenue sharing to somewhat tense relationship. By most accounts, your Blackberry business was an incredible win-win with telcos around the world. Story after story talked of the amazing partnerships between carriers and Blackberry. At the same time, stories (and blame game) between Apple and AT&T in the US became somewhat legendary. Yet even with this tension, the iPhone was bringing very valuable customers to AT&T and unseating Blackberry customers.
- Ubiquitous channel presence to exclusives. Your global partnership strength was unmatched and yet disrupted. The iPhone launched with single carriers in limited markets, on purpose. Many viewed that as a liability, including Blackberry. Yet in hindsight this only increased the value to the selected partners and created demand from other potential partners (even with the tension).
- Revenue sharing to data plan. One of the main assets that was mostly invisible to consumers was the revenue to Blackberry for each device on the network. This was because Blackberry was running a secure email service as a major anchor of the offering. Most thought no one was going to give up this revenue, including the carrier ability to up-charge for your Blackberry. Few saw a transition to a heavily subsidized business model with high priced data plans purchased by consumers.
These are just a few and any one of these is probably debatable. The point is really the breadth of changes the iPhone introduced to the Blackberry offering and roadmap. Some of these are assumptions about the technology, some about the business model, some about the ecosystem, some about physics even!
Imagine you’ve just changed the world and everything you did to change the world–your entire world view–has been changed by a new product. Now imagine that the new product is not universally applauded and many folks not only say your product is better and more useful, but that the new product is simply inferior.
Put yourself in those shoes…
Disruption happens when a new product comes along and changes the underlying assumptions of the incumbent, as we all know.
Incumbent products and businesses respond by often downplaying the impact of a particular feature or offering. And more often than folks might notice, disruption doesn’t happen so easily. In practice, established businesses and products can withstand a few perturbations to their offering. Products can be rearchitected. Prices can be changed. Features can be added.
What happens though when nearly every assumption is challenged? What you see is a complete redefinition of your entire company. And seeing this happen in real time is both hard to see and even harder to acknowledge. Even in the case of Blackberry there was a time window of perhaps 2 years to respond–is that really enough time to re-engineer everything about your product, company, and business?
One way to look at this case is that disruption rarely happens from a single vector or attribute, even though the chorus might claim X disrupts Y because of price or a single feature, for example. We can see this in the case of something like desktop linux–being lower priced/open source are interesting attributes but it is fair to say that disruption never really happened to the degree that might have been claimed early on.
However, if you look at Linux in the data center the combination of using Linux for proprietary data center architectures and services combined with the benefit of open source/low price brought with it a much more powerful disruptive capability.
One might take away from this case and other examples, that the disruption to watch out for the most would be the one that combined multiple elements of the traditional marketing mix of product, price, place, promotion. When considering these dimensions it is also worth understanding the full breadth of assumptions, both implicit and explicit, in your product and business when defending against disruption. Likewise, if you’re intending to disrupt you want to consider the multiple dimensions of your approach in order to bypass the intrinsic defenses of incumbents.
It is not difficult to talk about disruption in our industry. As product and business leaders it is instructive to dive into a case of disruption and consider not just all the factors that contributed but how would you respond personally. Could you really lead a team through the process of creating a product that literally inverted almost every business and technology assumption that created $80B or so in market cap over a 10 year period?
In The Sun Also Rises, Hemingway wrote:
How did you go bankrupt? Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.
That is how disruption happens.